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This section contains a digest of all reported decisions from jurisdictions
interpreting provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code published from
March 1, 1963 through August 21, 1963, in the National Reporter System.
Case citations preceded by a dagger (t) indicate decisions which are based
upon language contained in the 1953 Official Version of the Code; those pre-
ceded by a double dagger ($), the 1962 Official Version from which Code
extracts herein used are taken. •Case citations preceded by an asterisk (*)
indicate decisions construing or interpreting provisions of the Code even
though the Code did not govern the decision. All other decisions are based




ARTICLE 1: GENERAL PROVISIONS
SECTION 1-103. Supplementary General Principles of
Law Applicable
Unless displaced by the particular provisions of this Act, the prin-
ciples of law and equity, including the law merchant and the law relative
to capacity to contract, principal and agent, estoppel, fraud, misrepresenta-
tion, duress, coercion, mistake, bankruptcy, or other validating or in-
validating cause shall supplement its provisions.
CASES ANNOTATED UNDER OTHER SECTIONS
COMMONWEALTH BANK & TRUST CO. V. KEECH
— Pa. Super. —, 192 A.2d 133 (1963)
See the Annotation to Section 2-602(1), infra.
SECTION 1-201. General Definitions
Subject to additional definitions contained in the subsequent Articles
of this Act which are applicable to specific Articles or Parts thereof, and
unless the context otherwise requires, in this Act:
(37) "Security interest" means an interest in personal property or
fixtures which secures payment or performance of an obligation. The re-
tention or reservation of title by a seller of goods notwithstanding ship-
ment or delivery to the buyer (Section 2-401) is limited in effect to a
reservation of a "security interest". The term also includes any interest of
a buyer of accounts, chattel paper, or contract rights which is subject to
Article 9. The special property interest of a buyer of goods on identification
150
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE ANNOTATIONS
of such goods to a contract for sale under Section 2-401 is not a "security
interest", but a buyer may also acquire a "security interest" by complying
with Article 9. Unless a lease or consignment is intended as security,
reservation of title thereunder is not a "security interest" but a consignment
is in any event subject to the provisions on consignment sales (Section
2-326). Whether a lease is intended as security is to be determined by the
facts of each case; however, (a) the inclusion of an option to purchase
does not of itself make the lease one intended for security, and (b) an
agreement that upon compliance with the terms of the lease the lessee
shall become or has the option to become the owner of the property for
no additional consideration or for a nominal consideration does make the
lease one intended for security.
(44) "Value". Except as otherwise provided with respect to negotiable
instruments and bank collection (Sections 3-303, 4-208 and 4-209) a per-
son gives "value" for rights if he acquires them
(a) in return for a binding commitment to extend credit or for
the extension of immediately available credit whether or
not drawn upon and whether or not a charge-back is pro-
vided for in the event of difficulties in collection; or
(b) as security for or in total or partial satisfaction of a pre-
existing claim; or
(c) by accepting delivery pursuant to a pre-existing contract for
purchase; or
(d) generally, in return for any consideration sufficient to sup-
port a simple contract.
ANNOTATION
SPURLIN V. SLOANE
368 S.W.2d 314 (Ky. 1963)
During the course of their work under a road contract with the state,
Burchett became indebted to his partners. When the road was completed, he
assigned his share of the contract money due from the state to his partners
and, according to the terms of the assignment, the state agreed to mail the
amount due to a creditor-bank of the partners. Before it did so, the contract
money was attached by plaintiff, a judgment creditor of Burchett. In an action
to establish the priority of his lien, the plaintiff contended that the assignment
was of a significant part of Burchett's contract rights which had not been
perfected as required by Section 9-302(1) (e), and that, as a result, the rights
of the partners were inferior to those of the plaintiff, a lien creditor, under
Section 9-301(1) (b). The trial court rejected the argument and awarded
judgment to the assignees.
Upon appeal, the judgment was affirmed, the court holding first that the
assignment was not of a "contract right" but of an "account" as defined in
Section 9-106, and second, that the assignment was not a security transaction
as defined in Section 1-207(37) of the Code.' No part of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, the court concluded, ". . . applies to a written assignment of
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funds presently due and owing for the purpose of liquidation or satisfying a
prior existing obligation."
COMMENT
I. The court properly decided that Burchett had assigned an account,
not a contract right, because the money was due for services already performed
at the time of assignment. The distinction has little bearing on the issue since
either an account or a contract right may serve as collateral in a secured
transaction as provided in Section 9-102. The assignment of either is subject
to the same rules for perfection under Section 9-302 and Section 9-102 pro-
vides that either may be the subject of sale.
2. Both Section 9-302(1) (e), which requires filing to perfect security
interests, and Section 9-301(1) (b), which provides that an unperfected se-
curity interest is subordinate to the rights of a lien creditor without knowledge
of the security interest, presuppose the existence of a security interest which,
by the principal definition of Section 1-201(37), must secure payment of an
obligation. An "... assignment ... to pay off a loan ..." could not have been
intended merely to secure payment of the loan.
3. The plaintiff failed to use the argument that the satisfaction of an
existing debt by an assignment of an account (or contract right) constitutes
a sale of that account, which is also included in the definition of "security
interest" and within the purview of Article 9. The word "sale," as used in
Article 9, is undefined; therefore, it may not be improper to say that the
account in the instant case was sold for the release from indebtedness. A sale
of goods does not require a price in money and Section 2-304(1), although
applying to sales of goods, courts may well use by analogy for the meaning
of the word "sale" as it applies to accounts or contract rights.
Such a result, it is arguable, is commercially desirable since Article 9 is
designed to protect innocent creditors from a secret transfer of substantial
intangible assets upon which they relied.
S.L.P.
ANNOTATION
UNITED RENTAL EQUIP. CO . V. POTTS & CALLAHAN CONTRACTING CO.
— Md. —, 191 A.2d 570 (1963)
In 1960, United leased an air compressor to lessee at $800 per month for
a minimum period of one month under a writing which also provided that the
lessee would continue to pay the $800 per month until the compressor was
returned to United and that 85% of the rental was to be applied toward the
purchase price of $14,500. United had the right to terminate at any time. The
lease, which was neither recorded nor filed, was executed in New Jersey and
the compressor was to be used in Pennsylvania.
While in possession of the compressor, the lessee gave a judgment note
for $24,000 to Mayers and subsequently mortgaged the compressor to Stan-
dard for $6,600. Approximately four months after the last transaction took
place, Mayers obtained judgment against the lessee and caused the compressor
to be attached and sold at a judicial sale to Potts for $5,900. Shortly after the
sale, United advised Potts that it claimed title to the compressor. Prior to this
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time Potts, Mayers and Standard had had no knowledge of the lease agree-
ment. Standard petitioned the court to have its mortgage claim paid from
the proceeds of the sale. Potts intervened as plaintiff and joined United, Mayers
and Standard as defendants. The lower court held that Potts' title to the com-
pressor was unassailable, and United appealed.
In affirming, the court first determined that because the compressor was
to be used in Pennsylvania, the law of that state applied. It then held that
under Section 1-201(37) the lease created a security interest since the ap-
plication of 85% of the rental to the purchase price was sufficient to show the
lease was intended to be a secured transaction. Since the lease was within
the scope of Article 9 by Section 9-102(2), perfection under Section 9-301
(1)(6) was required to protect United's security interest from a subsequent
lien creditor of the lessee.
COMMENT
The court in effect found that the lease contained not a mere option to
purchase which, alone, would be insufficient to establish a secured transaction,
but rather an agreement whereby the "lessee" would become or have the
option to become the owner upon compliance with the lease and for no ad-
ditional or only nominal consideration. The 85% application to the agreed
price apparently met the last requirement. Even though the lessor had the
right to terminate the lease at any time and the lessee was under no obliga-
tion beyond one month, the court impliedly found that the lessee had an
option to purchase by which the lessor was bound whenever and for whatever
reason the lease arrangement terminated. This is no doubt a correct result
under Section 1-201(37).
B.M.H.
CASES ANNOTATED UNDER OTHER SECTIONS
UNITED REFRIGERATOR CO. V. APPLEBAUM
410 Pa. 210, 189 A.2d 253 (1963)
See the Annotation to Section 3-415(5), infra.
SECTION 1-207. Performance or Acceptance Under Reservation
of Rights
A party who with explicit reservation of rights performs or promises
performance or assents to performance in a manner demanded or of-
fered by the other party does not thereby prejudice the rights reserved.
Such words as "without prejudice", "under protest" or the like are suf-
ficient.
CASES ANNOTATED UNDER OTHER SECTIONS
COMMONWEALTH BANK & TRUST CO. V. KEECH
— Pa. Super. —, 192 A.2d 133 (1963)
See the Annotation to Section 2-602(1), infra.
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